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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Carlos E. Lazarus*
In actions for damages against the husband, shown to have
been the result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by
the wife, the courts of appeal had announced conflicting rules.
The courts of appeal for the Parish of Orleans and for the
First Circuit had taken the position that the husband, in order
to avoid liability must allege and prove that the vehicle was not
being operated on a mission for his benefit or for that of the
community.' On the other hand, the rule announced by the Court
of Appeal for the Second Circuit was to the effect that in such
cases, the plaintiff must, in order to state a cause of action,
affirmatively allege and prove that the vehicle was being
operated for the benefit of the husband or for that of the com-
munity.2
This conflict is resolved by the Supreme Court in Martin v.
Brown.3 Taking the sound position that since there is no right
to proceed against a husband merely because of his relationship
as such to the tortfeasor, a petition against the husband states
no cause of action unless it contains allegations that his wife
was on a mission for the community at the time of the commis-
sion of the tort. The basis of liability in such cases, said the
court, is agency, and therefore, his consent, actual or implied,
for the use of the vehicle by the wife as well as the fact that
she was engaged in the service of her husband or in a mission
for the benefit of the community, are necessary elements to be
the heirs are sent into possession without an adminstration. If the security is
not furnished, the judgment of possession may be annulled. Article 3008. This
article also provides that conventional mortgages and other encumbrances recorded
prior to cancellation of the inscription of the registry of the judgment of posses-
sion shall retain their initial force. Even if this is extended to include purchases,
as the comment indicates it should be, the article simply protects against any
adverse effects of cancellation of the judgment of possession and would not
eliminate the unrecorded privilege.
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Johnson v. Delta Fire & Casualty Co., 110 So.2d 215 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1959).
2. Martin v. Brown, 117 So.2d 665 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960) in which the
court said: "The basis for this conclusion rests upon the principle that the burden
of proof of an action in tort against a principal or master or employer, seeking
to fix liability for the acts of the agent or servant or employee, requires pleading
and proof of the respective relationships by the plaintiff . . . . [W]e see no reason-
able ground for distinction between the categories above enumerated and that of
husband and wife." Id. at 666.
3. 240 La. 674, 124 So.2d 904 (1960), 21 LoUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 647 (1961).
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alleged. But, said the court, "once the plaintiff has stated a
cause of action and established that the accident occurred
through the negligence of the wife in her use of the community
car, which she was operating with the permission and consent
(actual or implied) of the husband, since the husband has
peculiar knowledge of facts which would relieve him of liability
it then devolves upon him should he seek to avoid responsibility
to show, to the satisfaction of the court, that the wife was on a
mission of her own." 4
Thus the question resolves itself into one of pleading and
proof in which the plaintiff carries the burden of alleging all
the necessary elements and of proving all but one, viz., that the
wife was on a community errand, as to which the defendant
husband carries the burden of persuasion to the contrary.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
The opinion of the court in McGuffy v. Weill contains an
interesting discussion of the legal nature of a restriction against
the use of land. In connection with the sale of a city lot, the
parties signed a separate contract in authentic form under the
terms of which the vendor agreed that an adjoining lot would
never be used except for residential purposes. It was provided
that this restriction would constitute a covenant running with
the land, binding upon all subsequent owners. The contract was
recorded. Thereafter, the plaintiff, a successor in title to the.
original vendor, sought a declaratory judgment that the lot was
free of the restriction. In holding against the plaintiff, the court
found the restriction to be a continuous, non-apparent servitude,
and concluded that, having been recorded in the form of a
notarial act, it was "established by title" although it was not
included in the act of sale itself. Consequently it was held bind-
ing. This classification is helpful. In addition, the decision may
tend to overcome the impression obtainable from some earlier
cases that a restriction of this kind is valid only if contained in
a general scheme or plan of land development. Such a qualifica-
4. Martin v. Brown, 240 La. 674, 683, 124 So.2d 904, 908 (1960).
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1. 240 La. 758, 125 So.2d 154 (1960).
